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From disputat io  to predicat io⎯and back again: Dialectic, Authority and 
Epistemology between the Roman de la Rose  and the Pèler inage de Vie Humaine 
 
Marco Nievergelt 
 
Modern critics on the whole have found it rather difficult to account for the success of 
Guillaume de Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de Vie Humaine with medieval readers,1 and the 
poem is still widely misunderstood whenever it is not overlooked or dismissed out of 
hand. Things have begun to improve over the last decade, with the appearance of a 
number of studies on the circulation, translation and reception of Deguileville.2 This is a 
welcome development, but it may also have distracted our attention somewhat from the 
internal workings of this influential, rich and complex allegory, still insufficiently studied 
in terms of its place within multiple overlapping contexts⎯intellectual, literary, cultural, 
and political.3 The survival of two rather different versions of the poem, PVH1 from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Research for this article was carried out during a stay as a visiting scholar at Corpus Christi College Oxford 
in 2013, and funded by a Swiss National Science Foundation ‘Ambizione’ Fellowship. I would like to thank 
both institutions for their support, along with Jonathan Simon Morton and Phil Knox for their precious 
feedback and discussion. I would also like to thank Graham Robert Edwards and Philippe Maupeu for 
making available their edition of Deguileville’s Livre du pèlerin de vie humaine (1355) while it was still in 
progress, and Stephanie A. V. G. Kamath, Fabienne Pomel and Nicolette Zeeman for sharing their work 
ahead of publication. 
1 The Pèlerinage is one of the most popular vernacular verse narratives of the later Middle Ages. It exists in 
around 80 MSS (for details see http://jonas.irht.cnrs.fr s.v. ‘guillaume de digulleville’), and was 
subsequently adapted into French prose, English verse and prose, German, Dutch, Spanish and Latin. It 
also went through 10 printed editions in French, one in Spanish and several in Dutch.  
2 For an overview of the state of research see two recent volumes, Mittelalterliche Literatur als Retextualisierung. 
Das ‘Pèlerinage’-Corpus des Guillaume de Deguileville im europäischen Mittelalter, ed. by Andreas Kablitz and Ursula 
Peters (Heidelberg, 2014); and The Pèlerinage Allegories of Guillaume de Deguileville: Tradition, Authority and 
Influence, ed. Stephanie A. V. G. Kamath and Marco Nievergelt (Cambridge, 2013). See further Guillaume de 
Digulleville: les Pèlerinages allégoriques, actes du Colloque de Cerisy-la-Salle, 5–8 Octobre 2006, ed. by Frédéric Duval 
and Fabienne Pomel (Rennes, 2008); Stephanie A. V. G. Kamath, Authorship and First-Person Allegory in late 
Medieval France and England. (Cambridge, 2012); Marco Nievergelt, Allegorical Quests from Deguileville to Spenser 
(Cambridge, 2012); Philippe Maupeu, Pèlerins de Vie Humaine: Autobiographie et allégorie narrative de Guillaume de 
Deguileville à Octovien de Saint Gelais (Paris, 2009). 
3 For such a call to return to PVH1 itself see Frédéric Duval, ‘Interpréter le Pèlerinage de vie humaine de 
Guillaume de Digulleville (vers 1330)’, in La moisson des lettres: l’invention littéraire autour de 1300, ed. Hélène 
Bellon-Méquelle et al. (Turnhout, 2011), 233–52. 
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1331, and PVH2 from 1355–6, further complicates the picture, but affords us the rare 
opportunity to trace the internal tensions, shifts and transformations of an author’s 
poetic vision over time.4  
The Pèlerinage presents an account of the poet’s ostensible dream-vision, and 
features a pilgrim-persona who is simultaneously dreamer, first-person narrator, 
protagonist and expositor of his quest. This complex narrative configuration of the 
subject develops in the wake of the Roman de la Rose,5 Deguileville’s declared model and 
evoked in the opening lines of his poem (PVH1, 7–11). Yet Deguileville’s poem also 
seeks to harness the energies of first-person allegorical narrative to avowedly spiritual 
and salvific ends. The pilgrimage thus figures a complex pedagogical trajectory, and the 
reader is invited to identify with the pilgrim and participate actively in the learning 
process. Deguileville uses the Augustinian motif of the pilgrimage to figure the learning 
process of the Christian wayfarer,	  6 and indeed the poem as a whole develops an 
unmistakeably Augustinian/Platonist anthropology and epistemology.7 Augustine had 
developed the idea of the Christian life as a journey especially in his hugely popular De 
Doctrina Christiana, whose influence on Deguileville has already been suggested by other 
critics.8 In the De Doctrina the journey traces an itinerary of Christian learning that enables 
the individual pilgrim’s ‘return’ to his heavenly home (De Doctrina 1. 4. 4; 1. 10. 10; 1. 18. 
17), and pilgrimage here visualises a transformation that is at once interpretive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For PVH1 see Guillaume de Deguileville, Le Pèlerinage de Vie Humaine de Guillaume de Deguileville, edited by 
J. J. Stürzinger (London, 1893). For PVH2 I refer to the pre-proof manuscript of the forthcoming edition, 
kindly shared by the editors; see Guillaume de Deguileville, Le Livre du pèlerin de vie humaine (1355), ed. 
Philippe Maupeu and Graham Robert Edwards. Lettres Gothiques (Paris, 2015). 
5 See especially Kamath, Authorship and First-Person Allegory. 
6 On the importance of the idea of pilgrimage in Augustine’s thought, see Paul G. Kuntz, ‘From Homo Erro 
to Homo Viator’, Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), 79–89; Robert J. O’Connell, St Augustine’s Confessions: The 
Odyssey of Soul (Cambridge, MA, 1969); M. A. Claussen ‘Peregrinatio and Peregrini in Augustine’s City of God’, 
Traditio 46 (1991), 33–75. 
7 See Sarah Kay, ‘The Divided Path in Guillaume de Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de Vie Humaine: Separation and 
Identity’, in The Place of Thought: The Complexity of One in late Medieval French Didactic Poetry (Philadelphia, 
2007), 70–94. See also the classic account by Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books and 
their Posterity (Princeton, 1966), 145–218 (170–5). 
8 Kay, Place of Thought, 73 and passim. 
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pedagogical, ethical, cognitive, and ontological.9 The journey ultimately aims to convert 
and transform the pilgrim self, seeking to restore his prelapsarian cognitive and 
intellectual faculties through the recovery of man’s divine resemblance obscured by the 
fall (De Doctrina 1. 22. 20; 1. 34. 38; cf. PVH1 5945–6158)—an idea echoed by 
Deguileville by the pilgrim’s inaugural vision of the New Jerusalem, and throughout the 
subsequent journey towards the Heavenly City.  
Deguileville transforms the theoretical formulations of Augustine’s treatise into a 
dynamic and experiential first-person narrative. His pilgrimage allegory thus provides an 
account of how Augustinian ontology, epistemology, and hermeneutics materialise in 
action, experienced and recounted from the subjective, embodied viewpoint of the 
clumsy and recalcitrant first-person protagonist. The pilgrim’s adventures and 
misadventures thus allow Deguileville to unpack and explore, bit by bit, the various 
aspects or building blocks of the poem’s Platonist worldview, by correcting the 
erroneous beliefs of an ill-advised pilgrim-reader persona. In this sense PVH is not so 
much a didactic poem that merely exposes its teaching, but a programmatic allegory that 
involves its readers, as fellow pilgrims, in the gradual construction of an epistemological 
system. 
Contrary to a widely held assumption, then, the Pèlerinage is not primarily a 
didactic work—at least not in the reductive or narrow sense of a normative, morally 
prescriptive poem.10 Instead its central concerns are essentially epistemological, cognitive, 
and hermeneutical, within a wider theological and soteriological perspective. Indeed the 
emphasis in PVH is not so much on doing the right thing, but on knowing, specifically on 
discriminating between the good and the bad, and discerning truth from deception and 
illusion.11 ‘Discernment’ accordingly holds pride of place in the teaching administered by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For such a hermeneutics of the self understood as an ethics of reading in Augustine’s thought, see 
especially Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge and the Ethics of Interpretation (Cambridge, 
MA, 1996), especially 207–78. 
10 For an invitation to reconsider didacticism as an intellectually engaging mode or discourse see especially 
Kay, The Place of Thought, especially 1–18; and Catherine Brown, Contrary Things: Exegesis, Dialectic and the 
Poetics of Didacticism (Stanford, 1998), especially 8–11. 
11 A reading in this sense is proposed by Susan K. Hagen, Allegorical Remembrance: a Study of ‘The Pilgrimage of 
the life of Man’ as a Medieval Treatise on Seeing and Remembering (Athens, GA / London, 1990). Hagen however 
sees PVH as an essentially unproblematic and internally unified allegory, and focuses largely on Lydgate’s 
translation of PVH2. This obscures the specificities of Deguileville’s poem in its different versions, and 
glosses over its internal tensions and contradictions. For Lydgate’s version see The Pilgrimage of the Life of 
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Sapience, who together with Grace Dieu is the principal figure of authority in the poem. 
As Sapience states,  
 
L'entendement [...] enfourmoie 
A arguer et desputer 
Et a jugier et discerner 
Entre le bon et le mauves (PVH1 3012–15)12 
 
[I have formed/informed understanding to argue and dispute, to judge and 
discern between the good and the bad.] 
 
The knowledge envisaged here goes beyond the specifically exegetical, hermeneutic 
knowledge taught by the De Doctrina Christiana, and embraces the art of dialectic, or arte 
bene disputandi, which teaches to argue, judge and discern. And indeed on his journey the 
pilgrim must engage in debates with a wide range of personifications, assess their 
arguments, understand their teaching or see through their verbal deception. 
By placing the art of dialectic under the aegis of Sapience, Deguileville implies 
that it is subservient to the poem’s larger, essentially sapiential and salvific aims. Yet the 
arts of debate and dialectic reasoning occupy a far more problematic and unstable place 
within the poem. PVH as a whole is in fact characterised by a deep ambivalence about 
scholastic and academic learning of all kinds, and in many areas Deguileville appears to 
adopt strongly anti-Aristotelian positions. This is the case with his rejection of 
Aristotelian hylomorphism in favour of substance dualism, and his elaboration a clearly 
illuminationist theory of cognition,13 or with his humorous remarks on the limitations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Man, trans. John Lydgate, ed. F. J. Furnivall and Katharine B. Locock, 3 vols, EETS OS 78, 83 and 92 
(London, 1899–1904). 
12 The pilgrim himself is ‘discerne des autres bestes’ (PVH1 856; ‘separated from the other animals’) by his 
rational skill. Further teaching about ‘discernement’ is provided by figures of authority at PVH1 1098, 
1108, 1680, and the related notion of ‘discretion’, often applied to the pilgrim’s ‘jugement’ or 
‘entendement’, is invoked at PVH1 1085, 1118, 1242, 1260, 1703, 3078. English translations from French 
are mine throughout. For a translation into modern English prose see Guillaume de Deguileville, The 
Pilgrimage of Human Life, trans. Eugene Clasby (New York, 1992). 
13 I discuss Deguileville’s theory of the soul and cognition in a forthcoming piece, ‘Can Thought 
Experiments Backfire? Avicenna’s Flying Man, Intellectual Cognition and the Experience of Allegory in 
Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de Vie Humaine’, in Medieval Thought Experiments: Poetry and Speculation in Europe, 1100–
1450, ed. Philip Knox, Jonathan Morton and Daniel Reeve (Turnhout, forthcoming 2016). For an 
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Aristotelian natural science.14 In what follows I explore one aspect of Deguileville’s 
defensive attitude towards the ‘new’ Aristotelian sciences, by concentrating on his 
complex but fundamentally ambivalent attitude towards dialectic and the related practice 
of scholastic disputatio. This ambivalence is fed not only by a well-established tradition of 
distrust in logic by medieval intellectuals, particularly monastic authors; it is also 
sustained by Deguileville’s problematic, uncomfortably close engagement with the Roman 
de la Rose, PVH’s most powerful intertext. Accordingly I begin with a brief discussion of 
Jean de Meun’s complex, ironic and idiosyncratic treatment of disputatio and the 
principles and practices of dialectic in the Rose. I suggest that Deguileville read the Rose as 
simultaneously holding two different, related propositions: on the one hand the earlier 
poem could be understood as satirising the apodictic aspirations of dialectic 
argumentation understood as a discipline or science, especially as practiced in the late 
thirteenth-century schools. On the other hand, however, the Rose could also be read as 
adopting the principles of dialectical reasoning understood as a method, taking it to its 
extreme consequences—what I term the Rose’s ‘dialecticism’.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overview of illuminationist doctrines and their developments in the thirteenth century, see Timothy 
Noone, ‘Divine Illumination’, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina 
van Dyke, 2 vols (Cambridge, 2010), 1:369–83; for more detailed discussion of the progressive decline of 
doctrines of divine illumination, see Stephen P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of 
God in the Thirteenth Century, 2 vols (Leiden, 2001). For a concise overview of the cognitive implications of 
different models of faculty psychology, see John Haldane, ‘Soul and Body’, and Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘The 
Soul’s Faculties’, both in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. by Pasnau and van Dyke, 
respectively 1:293–304, and 1:305–19. Further see Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the 
Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Enlightenment, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht, 2007); Magdalena 
Bieniak, The Soul–Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries (Leuven, 2010), 
especially 15–34. 
14 See especially Stephanie A. V. G. Kamath, ‘Rewriting Ancient Auctores in the Pèlerinage de la vie humaine’ in 
Mittelalterliche Literatur als Retextualisierung, ed. Kablitz and Peters, 321–42, and discussion below. I warmly 
thank Stephanie Kamath and the editors of the volume for sharing this with me ahead of publication. 
15 A brief note on terminology and usage in what follows: I use ‘dialectic’ to refer in a general sense to a 
tradition of dialectic reasoning, often in the form of debate; this includes but is not limited to Aristotle’s 
codification of dialectic, in the Topics for instance, as a systematic use of syllogistic reasoning. When 
designating dialectic in the more narrow sense as one of the branches of the trivium, especially as pursued in 
the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century schools, I use the term ‘logic’. I reserve the term ‘dialecticism’ 
exclusively to designate Jean de Meun’s idiosyncratic application of the principles of dialectic in the Roman 
de la Rose, as outlined more fully in the following section. 
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In the second, core section of my analysis I examine PVH more closely, arguing 
that Deguileville’s attitude to dialectic is far more complex than we would expect from a 
Cistercian, monastic author. Writing in the Abbey of Chaalis, Deguileville could observe 
scholastic developments and controversies in nearby Paris from a safe distance, but 
could also benefit from access to a well-stocked monastic library that was not 
impermeable to more recent Aristotle commentaries as well as the usual monastic and 
patristic authors.16 Rather than merely dismissing the efforts of Aristotelian scholastic 
logic out of hand, then, Deguileville sets out to redefine and reclaim dialectic for 
different, explicitly sapiential and salvific purposes. In the process the poet also realises, 
however, the risks and difficulties of such a project. His attempts to appropriate 
Aristotelian logic and scholastic terms and methods more broadly are often merely 
cosmetic, and he remains finally ambivalent, even anxious concerning the unstable place 
of dialectic in his allegory. In a third section I argue that Deguileville’s ambivalent 
attitude towards dialectic is inseparable from his paradoxical attitude towards the Rose: 
both create analogous problems for the essentially Platonic or Augustinian grounding of 
his pilgrimage allegory, yet both exert a powerful, irresistible hold on Deguileville’s poetic 
method. Finally I suggest that Jean de Meun’s uncompromising dialecticism disrupts the 
teleology implicit in PVH’s pilgrimage allegory, forestalls narrative and epistemological 
closure, and thus gradually erodes both Deguileville’s confidence in the truth-value of his 
allegory and in the larger Platonist epistemology that his poem instantiates. This becomes 
increasingly apparent in the later, longer, more defensive and conflicted version of PVH. 
Despite its far more explicit rejection of the Rose, PVH2 is paradoxically animated by the 
dialecticism it also seeks to resist and suppress. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See especially Kamath, ‘Rewriting Ancient Auctores’, who notes the presence of a commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Humbert of Preuilly, himself a Cistercian. For the reconstructed contents of 
Chaalis Library see Anne Bondéelle–Souchier and Patricia Stirnemann, ‘Vers une reconstitution de la 
bibliothèque ancienne de l’abbaye de Chaalis: inventaires et manuscrits retrouvés’ in Parva pro magnis munera 
- études de littérature tardo-antique et médiévale offertes à François Dolbeau par ses élèves, ed. by Monique Goullet 
(Turnhout, 2009), 9–73. A commentary by Humbert on Aristotle’s De Anima, now lost, was equally held at 
Chaalis, as pointed out by Monica Brinzei Calma, ‘Le commentaire des Sentences d’Humbert de Preuilly’, 
Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 53 (2011), 81–148 (82, nn. 5 and 6), based on Carolus de Visch, Bibliotheca 
Scriptorum S. Ordinis Cisterciensis (Cologne, 1656), 165. 
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 The Rose : disputat io , dialectic and dialecticism 
 
The seminal Roman de la Rose,17 PVH’s most important intertext, marks a crucial nexus in 
the interface between academic culture and vernacular literature in the period 1250–1350. 
In all likelihood Jean de Meun’s familiarity with scholastic materials was direct, gained 
through some form of affiliation with the University of Paris, and the poem is steeped in 
clerical and academic culture more broadly.18 Yet the place of vernacular, fictional works 
in relation to the institutional authority of scholasticism remains extremely difficult to 
assess, since literary texts often engage but also transform academic ideas and discourses 
through translatio, by transposing and refiguring them in a different, more deregulated 
vernacular context whose epistemological underpinnings are often implicit, unstable or 
unclear.19 Over thirty years ago Badel cautioned readers against any easy and direct 
alignment of the Rose with an ‘Averroistic’ agenda,20 and we are only beginning to explore 
the infinitely rich and intellectually provocative nature of the poem’s engagement with 
scholastic ideas and academic culture.21 Thus, even if the scholastic character of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I use Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Félix Lecoy, 3 vols (Paris, 1965–
70). 
18 See especially Ian Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, ca. 1100–1330 
(Cambridge, 2012), 356–74; and Gisela Hilder, Der scholastische Wortschatz bei Jean de Meun: die artes liberales 
(Tübingen, 1972). See further the work of Gérard Paré, Le Roman de la Rose et la Scolastique Courtoise (Paris, 
1941); ibid., Les Idées et les Lettres au XIIIème siècle: Le Roman de la Rose (Montréal, 1947). 
19 Nicolette Zeeman, ‘The Schools Give a License to Poets’, in Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Rita Copeland (Cambridge, 1996), 151–80; and Adrian Armstrong and Sarah Kay, Knowing Poetry: Verse in 
Medieval France from the ‘Rose’ to the ‘Rhétoriqueurs’ (Ithaca, 2011). More specifically on a post-1277 vernacular 
context, mostly on works in German but with wider implications, see the remarks in Nikolaus Largier, ‘Das 
Glück des Menschen: Diskussionen über beatitudo und Vernunft in volkssprachlichen Texten des 14 
Jahrhunderts’, in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten 
Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Keith Emery, and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 
2001), 827–55 (833–4). On the role of the vernacular in transforming notions of authority in later English 
works, see Alastair Minnis’s ‘Introduction: Valuing the Vernacular’, in his Translations of Authority in Medieval 
English Literature (Cambridge, 2009), 1–16. For an overview of the clerical literature produced in Paris 
during the thirteenth century and its relationship to the University world, see Alain Corbellari, La Voix des 
Clercs: Littérature et Savoir Universitaire autour des Dits du XIIIe Siècle (Geneva, 2005). 
20 Pierre-Yves Badel, Le Roman de la Rose au XIVe siècle: Etude de la Réception de l’Oeuvre (Genève, 1980), 32–8. 
21 Among recent examples see for instance Mary Franklin-Brown, Reading the World: Encyclopedic Writing in 
the Scholastic Age (Chicago and London, 2012), 183–214; Jonathan Morton, ‘The Roman de la Rose: Nature, 
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second Rose has long been acknowledged, the exact nature and significance of Jean’s 
attitude to scholasticism continues to elude us.  
Jean’s Rose cultivates a complex, at times subversive relationship to Latin learning 
more generally: it is peppered with fragments of Latin auctoritates (Aristotle, Alan of Lille, 
Boethius, Cicero, Ovid, etc.), all of which are, however, ‘glossed [...] to within an inch of 
their lives’⎯decontextualised, distorted, subverted, and further played off against each 
other.22 In this way multiple auctoritates are subjected to a process of destabilising and de-
familiarising translatio into the vernacular,23 which prompts deep and problematic 
reconsiderations of the notion of auctoritas as such. It is therefore not at the level of his 
sources, but rather in his poetic method that we may find Jean’s most intense 
engagement with scholasticism, in his idiosyncratic adaptation of the principles of 
dialectic.24  
Dialectic itself is of course a malleable and slippery concept in the hands of 
medieval intellectuals25⎯and its slipperiness was not lost on Jean de Meun. While 
Aristotle provided what was arguably the most influential discussion of the art with the 
Topics, it would be a simplification to label dialectic itself as a strictly ‘Aristotelian’ 
discipline. In its broad, primary sense dialectica was primarily understood as a codification 
of the Socratic method, and was thus understood to refer simply to an arte de bene 
disputandi.26 And dialogic altercation is of course a central means of creating and 
negotiating meaning in the Rose, and similarly determines the complex, dialogic 
modalities of the Rose’s reception as a continued, multi-vocal and conflictual debate as in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sex and Language in Thirteenth-Century Poetry and Philosophy’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Oxford, 2013); Earl Jeffrey Richards, ‘Introduction’, in Debating the Roman de la Rose: A Critical Anthology, 
ed. Christine McWebb (New York, 2007), xxi–xxxvi (xxxi–xxxiii). 
22 Sylvia Huot, Dreams of Lovers and Lies of Poets: Poetry, Knowledge and Desire in the Roman de la Rose (London, 
2010), 24, see also 3–7. 
23 See David F. Hult, ‘Poetry and the Translation of Knowledge in Jean de Meun’, in Poetry, Knowledge and 
Community in Late Medieval France, ed. Rebecca Dixon and Finn E. Sinclair (Cambridge, 2008), 19–41. 
24 A concise and influential analysis in this sense is provided by Daniel Poirion, ‘De la signification selon 
Jean de Meun’, in L’Archéologie du Signe, ed. Lucie Brind’Amour and Eugene Vance (Toronto, 1983), 165–
85, especially 181–2. For the early impact of dialectic on French courtly literature see Tony Hunt, 
‘Aristotle, Dialectic and Courtly Literature’, Viator 10 (1979), 95–129; and Sarah Kay, Courtly Contradictions: 
The Emergence of the Literary Object in the Twelfth Century (Stanford, 2001), especially 11–19. 
25 On terminology see also above, n.15. 
26 On this and the ulterior developments of dialectic in the medieval discipline of logic see especially the 
articles collected in Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic (Ithaca, 1989). 
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the famous fifteenth-century Querelle,27 or Deguileville’s own Pèlerinage de vie Humaine in its 
two versions, frequently presented as an ‘exposé sur le Roman de la Rose’ in manuscripts.28 
Yet more often than not debate in the Rose degenerates into a sequence of 
extended, learned yet apparently digressive monologues whose argumentative rigour is 
far from impeccable, and whose purpose is often unclear or merely contingent upon 
immediate context; in short, such speeches invariably fail to produce the kind of 
syllogistic conclusions envisaged by the medieval art of dialectic as defined by Aristotle. 
In composing such pseudo-disputationes, Jean is clearly indulging in his characteristic 
satirical vein,29 but it remains extremely difficult to identify the ultimate object of his 
satire. Of course he satirises the exploitation of faulty syllogistic reasoning for deceptive 
ends, as in the case of Faus Semblant30—but what does this imply about his broader 
attitude to dialectic? Is he merely denouncing the misuse of dialectic for deceptive 
purposes, or is he warning his readers about dialectic itself because of its inherently 
deceptive potential? Is he satirising the discrepancy between the principles of dialectic 
and its practice in the form of scholastic disputationes by cunning logicians? Or is he 
satirising the rise of logic and its exalted claims to be the leading branch of the trivium, 
and the consequent elevation of dialectic from instrument or method to a discipline or 
science in its own right, possibly an end in itself? Or does he point out the confusion of 
the combative, impassionate dialectic disputatio with the more formalised and rigorous 
scholastic disputatio?31 Or the confusion of the merely probable arguments produced by 
the dialectic syllogism, as described in the Topics, with the necessary arguments produced 
by the demonstrative syllogism outlined in the Posterior Analytics⎯a tension already hard-
wired into Aristotle’s own philosophy?32 Or is Jean merely targeting the dialectical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See especially Debating the Roman de la Rose, ed. McWebb; Badel, Le Roman de la Rose au XIVe siècle; Le 
Débat sur le ‘Roman de la Rose’, ed. Eric Hicks (Paris, 1977). 
28 Maupeu, Pèlerins de Vie Humaine, 275–7. 
29 For which see mainly Alastair Minnis, Magister Amoris: The ‘Roman de la Rose’ and Vernacular Hermeneutics 
(Oxford, 2001), especially ch. 2. 
30 See especially Fabienne Pomel, ‘L’art du faux-semblant chez Jean de Meun ou “la langue doublée en 
diverses plications”’, Bien dire et bien aprandre 23 (2005), 295–313 (302–4). 
31 On the important distinction between dialectical disputatio and the scholastic disputatio, their separate 
origins and their relations, see Olga Weijers, ‘De la joute dialectique à la dispute scolastique’, Comptes rendus 
des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 143.2 (1999), 509–18. 
32 The difference between the demonstrative and dialectical mode was being reiterated by a number of 
mid-thirteenth century terminist logicians, for which see Eleonore Stump, ‘Terminist Logicians on the 
Topics’, in her Dialectic and its Place, 135–56. On the problematic epistemic status of notions of Aristotelian 
	   10	  
posturing, or even imposture, by the rather undisciplined demotic voices of an unnatural 
Nature, an unreasonable Raison, or a deceptively self-revealing Faus Semblant?  
I shall not attempt to answer such questions here, and I merely want to suggest 
that the Rose’s own evasiveness about the merits and dangers of dialectic, debate, and 
disputatio, plays a crucial role in shaping the later reception of the poem by readers such as 
Deguileville ot the authors involved in the Querelle. Ultimately it is extremely difficult to 
determine whether the Rose embraces the positive, exploratory possibilities of 
dialectic⎯and if so, under what terms exactly⎯or whether it satirises the apodictic 
claims of scholastic logic, or even parodies scholastic philosophy more broadly. It may 
indeed be doing all of these things, finally forcing its readers to rethink the very 
principles of dialectic reasoning and argumentation outside the box, through their own 
interpretive engagement with the lack of resolution in the Rose as a poem. Jean’s choice 
of vernacular poetry in this sense is far from innocent:33 writing an allegorical verse 
narrative allows him to explore the possibilities of dialectic in genuinely provocative ways 
that already refuse to conform to the formalised discursive paradigms of the academic 
disputatio and the scholastic episteme of Aristotelian logic. The Rose thus may be inviting 
its readers to reconsider the relationship between the principles of dialectic and its 
institutional forms taken in the thirteenth century: this finally interrogates scholasticism’s 
prerogative to be the sole, institutionally sanctioned depositary of an ostensibly apodictic 
Aristotelian ‘science’ of dialectic reasoning.  
In what follows I will refer to this relentless commitment to interrogate the 
epistemological authority of any discourse, including that of dialectic itself as a discipline, 
as Jean de Meun’s ‘dialecticism’. This dialecticism is clearly differentiated from 
Aristotelian dialectic in the narrow sense, which is given much the same treatment as all 
other discourses ventriloquised by the Rose⎯Boethian, Ovidian, Neoplatonic, etc.: none 
of these can finally carry any greater authority than the others. Still further, by frustrating 
any sense of precedence among these multiple, competing yet mutually contaminating 
discursive forms, the Rose also draws attention to its own composite, derivative and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘science’ in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century, see Robert Pasnau, ‘Science and Certainty’, in Cambridge 
History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Pasnau and van Dyke, 1:357–68. Further, on tensions in Aristotle’s own 
philosophy, see Robin Smith, ‘Aristotle's Logic’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/aristotle-
logic/ , especially sections 5–8. 
33 On Jean’s use of the vernacular see especially Hult, ‘Poetry and the Translation of Knowledge’; and 
Minnis, Magister Amoris, 158–63. 
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materially contingent nature, its multiple, indirect, and elusive signifying processes. This 
highlights the Rose’s relentlessly shifting epistemology, or indeed its conspicuous lack of 
any solid, integrated epistemological grounding.34 In Sarah Kay’s words ‘the Rose is not 
just dialectical but infinitely slippery’,35 and Jean finally frustrates all attempts to locate 
firm authority within any intra- or extra-diegetic discourse, literary or philosophical⎯a 
fortiori within the capacious and voracious allegorical meta-discourse of the Rose itself. 
 
 
Disputat io to predicat io  
 
Deguileville evokes the Rose as the source of inspiration for his own poem (PVH 7–13), 
and critics have referred to PVH as a ‘contrepartie édifiante’ of the Rose, with recent 
work emphasising a still deeper, more conflicted but also more productive relationship 
between the two poems.36 Yet Deguileville’s ambivalent attitude towards the Rose, I 
suggest, is not merely due to the erotic tenor of the earlier poem, but is also determined 
precisely by the Rose’s radical dialecticism and its epistemological slipperiness—or, to put 
it differently, by the Rose’s ability to interrogate and undermine any discourse it is brought 
in contact with. Pierre-Yves Badel and Sylvia Huot in particular have shown how later 
readers or remanieurs often sought to resolve the internal aporia of the poem by attempting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See also Nicolette Zeeman, ‘Philosophy in Parts: Jean de Meun, Chaucer, Lydgate’, in Uncertain Knowledge: 
Scepticism, Relativism and Doubt in the Middle Ages, ed. Dallas G. Denery II, Kantik Ghosh, and Nicolette 
Zeeman. Disputatio 14 (Turnhout, 2014), 213–34; I would like to thank the author and the editors for 
graciously sharing this piece ahead of publication. Further see also David F. Hult, ‘Language and 
Dismemberment: Abelard, Origen, and the Romance of the Rose’, in Rethinking the Romance of the Rose: Text, 
Image and Reception, ed. Kevin Brownlee and Sylvia Huot (Philadelphia, 1992), 101–130; Sarah Kay, 
’Women’s body of Knowledge: Epistemology and Misogyny in the Roman de la Rose’, in Framing Medieval 
Bodies, ed. Miri Rubin and Sarah Kay (Manchester, 1994), 211–35. 
35 Kay, Place of Thought, 179. 
36 Badel, Le Roman de la Rose au XIV siècle, 362–76; Steven Wright, ‘Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de vie humaine as 
“Contrepartie édifiante” of the Roman de la Rose’, Philological quarterly 68.4 (1989), 399–422; Sylvia Huot, The 
Roman de la Rose and its Medieval Readers: Interpretation, Reception, Manuscript Transmission (Cambridge, 1993), 
207–38; Fabienne Pomel, ‘Le Roman de la Rose comme voie de paradis: transposition, parodie et 
moralisation de Guillaume de Lorris à Jean Molinet’, in De la Rose: Texte, image, fortune, ed. Catherine Bel and 
Herman Braet (Leuven, 2006), 355–75’; Philippe Maupeu, ‘Bivium: l’écrivain nattier et le Roman de la Rose’, 
in Les Pèlerinages Allégoriques, ed. Duval and Pomel, 21–41; Kamath, Authorship and First-Person Allegory, 19–
58. 
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to ‘close down’ the allegory, to resolve it in favour of a single, dominant discourse.37 This 
is also the case of Deguileville, who tries to restore an authoritative moral senefiance in line 
with Raison’s speech in the Rose, where she pressures the lover to abandon the pursuit of 
sensuality and embark on a quest for higher knowledge.38  
Deguileville does this by appropriating a number of personified abstractions that 
are already found in the Rose⎯Nature, Raison, Huiseuse/Oiseuse⎯and by redefining 
their legitimate place, function, and authority within a much more tightly regulated 
allegorical cosmos. Although the speeches and clashes of such personifications are at 
times every bit as chaotic as in the Rose, the many debates in PVH primarily provide the 
opportunity for Grace Dieu or Sapience to remind such personification of their proper, 
legitimate place in a hierarchically structured allegorical universe. This strategy helps to 
establish the authority of Sapience’s and Grace Dieu’s dominant discourse, and allows 
Deguileville to expose, bit by bit, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
his allegory for the benefit of the pilgrim-reader. Here Nature, Grace, Raison, 
Sapience⎯and Aristotle⎯all return to occupy their legitimate place in a hierarchically 
structured, functional system. In this sense the dialogic, or horizontal, is geared towards 
resolving itself into the monologic, or vertical. In the process, PVH seeks to reconstruct 
a functional epistemology from the scattered debris of the Rose. 
This commitment to restoring a single, unified authoritative discourse is 
encapsulated in the poem’s opening vignette: here Deguileville crafts his own authorial 
persona by presenting himself as a monk from the Cistercian abbey of Chaalis preaching 
to an audience of laypeople (PVH1 15–34). Clearly predicatio here provides both the 
structural framework and the master-discourse of PVH,39 within which all subsequent 
misadventures, disputes and backslidings are rhetorically subsumed and contained. By 
presenting his narrator-persona as a source of authoritative instruction, Deguileville 
assimilates his own role with that of the authority figures of the poem, Grace Dieu and 
Sapience. He also signals that he himself, as auctor, has transcended the argumentative 
level altogether, and can now engage with his audience or readership at the higher level 
of an authoritative, monologic predicatio.   
Deguileville’s desire to exorcise the indeterminacies of debate and disputatio, and 
to subject argumentative dynamics to a higher, authoritative discourse, is exemplified by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Badel, Le Roman de la Rose au XIVe siècle; Huot, Readers. 
38 Huot, Readers, 211 and passim. 
39 On predicatio as master-discourse in PVH see especially Maupeu, Pèlerins, 98, 107–18. 
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an extended discussion of Eucharistic matters in PVH1—one of the core moments of 
the debate-section in the first half of the poem (PVH1 1431–3306). Lady Reason is 
baffled after witnessing the transubstantiation (PVH1 1488–90), retires to her tower to 
sulk (PVH1 1502), and determines to go and inform Lady Nature of such ‘unnatural’ 
practices as soon as possible: ‘Et vraiement je le dirai / A Nature quant la verrai’ (PVH1 
1491–2) [‘And I will certainly tell Nature, as soon as I see her’]. When Nature arrives on 
the scene she defends her own sphere of influence against the trespasses of Grace: ‘a 
vous je vien / Tencier pour deffendre le mien’ (PVH1 1519–20) [‘I come to you to argue 
and defend what is mine’]. Nature thus seeks to relegate Grace to the heavenly sphere, 
claiming for herself the sovereign mastery of the sublunary world, and drawing a clear 
boundary (‘bonne’) between their respective jurisdictions: 
 
Entre moi et vous assise  
Fu bonne qui nous devise 
... 
Celle roe si nous depart 
A chascune donne sa part 
De hors est la vostre partie 
...  
Mais par dedens trestout est mien. 
Maistresse sui des elemens (PVH1 1541–59) 
 
[Between you and me was erected a barrier that divides us [...] This wheel here 
separates us, gives each of us her part. Yours is on the outside [...] but within 
everything is mine. I am mistress of the elements] 
 
Rather than resolving this dispute in favour of Grace Dieu, Deguileville tries to 
show that the argument itself is pointless since it is based on mistaken premises. The 
point here is not so much that Grace Dieu wins the argument, but that there is no 
argument to be had. So it emerges that Nature misunderstands the metaphor she herself 
adopts to stake her claim: she understands the heavenly spheres as separating 
horizontally two mutually exclusive areas or territories of competence, whereas in fact 
they define a vertical and hierarchical system of concentric circles. Here the authority of 
Nature is necessarily, always and already subsumed within, and dependent on, the 
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workings of Grace. Accordingly Grace Dieu reminds her: ‘[le] bonnage / Qui est mis 
entre vous et moy / [...] il vous bonne, non pas moy’ (PVH1 1720-22) [‘the barrier that is 
between us prevents you from trespassing, but not me’]. 
The episode essentially ridicules Nature’s and Reason’s very desire to engage in 
argumentation at all, hinting at the sterility of academic debates on such issues. The 
allusion to academic disputatio is clear from the terms used to describe Nature’s 
aggressive, antagonistic attitude. Throughout the passage variations of the term ‘tencier’ 
(PVH1 1515; 1520; 1649; 1702; 1780; 1818; 1832; ‘to argue, to quarrel, to dispute’) are 
used to characterise her attitude. Her combative disposition, the pilgrim observes, marks 
her out immediately as a scholastic disputant rather than a preacher and theologian: 
‘Preste me sembla de tencier / Mont plus assez que de preschier’ (PVH1 1515–16, 
emphases mine) [‘she seemed more inclined to quarrel and dispute than to preach’].40 
Deguileville here again subordinates the irresolutions of disputatio to the authoritative, 
monologic speech of predicatio, echoing the opening scene of the poem where the 
primacy and authority of clerical preaching was established.  
The confrontational and territorial overtones of Nature’s claim also resonate with 
late thirteenth-century debates over the respective spheres of competence of theology 
and philosophy. This notably crystallised in the condemnations at the University of Paris 
during the 1270s, and more broadly in the general hostility against the trespassing 
philosophi theologizantes by members of the Theology Faculty.41 By deliberately casting 
Nature as an irascible and aggressive disputant, Deguileville assimilates her to the claims 
for emancipation—real or supposed—of a ‘secular’ philosophy by the Arts Faculty.42 So 
Nature proudly identifies herself as a ‘Maistresse’ (PVH1 1559), possibly a parodic and 
feminised magister in artibus who must be reminded that she is Grace’s 
chambermaid⎯much like philosophy needed to be reminded by Tempier, Bonaventure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Compare also Henri d’Andeli’s characterisation of ‘Logique’ as a ‘science ... qui toz jors tence’, Bataille des 
VII ars, line 6, in les Dits d’Henri d’Andeli, ed. Alain Corbellari (Paris, 2003). 
41 See La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277: Texte latin, traduction, introduction, ed. David Piché with Claude 
Lafleur (Paris, 1999), especially 163, 168–76. 
42 Such claims for an independence of philosophical thought may have been more imagined than real, as 
suggested by recent work. Also the long-term consequences of the conflict are now considered to have 
been less fractious and traumatic than formerly believed. See Nach der Verurteilung, ed. Aertsen, Emery and 
Speer, particularly Andreas Speer, ‘Sapientia nostra: zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer 
Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts’, 249–75. 
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and others involved in the condemnations, that she was ancilla theologiae:43 ‘Moi maistresse 
et vous chambriere’ (PVH1 1706) [‘I am mistress and you chambermaid’] according to 
Grace Dieu, who reduces Nature to her ‘oustil ou instrument’ (1796; ‘tool or 
instrument’).  
By implicating her in a debate she can never win, Deguileville thus highlights the 
helplessness of an emancipated ‘terrestrial’ philosophy, and her need to be subordinated 
to the higher aims and methods of a ‘celestial’ theology. This tension between grace and 
reason, Theology and Philosophy in PVH, was clearly appreciated by readers, and was 
used as a larger framework to explain the intertextual relationship between PVH and 
Rose, as suggested by Arras, Bibliothèque Municipale MS 845. The manuscript contains 
both Rose and PVH, and describes the latter as ‘fais par poeterie, comme li Livres de le 
Roze, qui est en grant partie de philozofie, mes cilz pelerinages est de theologie’ (fol. 
103r) [‘made of poetry, like the book of the rose, which is in large part of philosophy, but 
this pilgrimage is of theology’].44 Sapience’s condescending dismissal of Nature, then, acts 
for Deguileville as a miniature version of his larger refutation of profane philosophy. 
By thus ‘resolving’ a horizontal debate into a vertical, hierarchical relationship, 
Deguileville is also casting serious doubt on the dialectic method, or at least on its 
manifestation in the form of a disputatio involving a ‘Maistresse Nature’ effectively 
blinded by her anger, as Grace Dieu points out: 
 
Quar gens ires a deporter 
Sont, pour ce que voir discerner 
Ne peuent pas bien clerement 
Pour leur trouble entendement (PVH1 1679–82) 
 
[And angry folk are to be avoided, since they cannot discern the truth clearly 
because of their troubled understanding’] 
 
But it would be a mistake to read Deguileville’s humorous and condescending treatment 
of ‘Maistresse Nature’ as an outright dismissal of the dialectic method. Nature’s 
passionate, angry investment in the debate instead becomes for Deguileville an extreme 
example of disputatio spinning out of control, and provides him with the opportunity to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Piché, La Condamnation, 183–225. 
44 See Kamath, Authorship, 31 n.27, and discussion of this manuscript in Huot, Readers, 231–8. 
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redefine the real nature and purpose of dialectic. The target of Grace’s criticism is not 
dialectic itself, but Nature’s aggressive, self-promoting investment in the disputatio, which 
of course precludes any fruitful, lucid, rational and truly dialectic inquiry. Such an attitude 
fits remarkably well with Augustine’s observations in the Soliloquies, where he identifies 
the emotionally charged, confrontational atmosphere of public debate as fundamentally 
antithetical to genuine dialectical reasoning⎯views that in Deguileville’s eyes may have 
applied only too well to certain arcane and self-promoting exercises of disputatio in the 
late medieval schools: 
 
‘Cum enim neque melius quaeri veritas possit quam interrogando et respondendo 
et vix quisquam inveniatur, quem non pudeat convinci disputantem, eoque paene 
semper eveniat, ut rem bene inductam ad discutiendum inconditus pervicaciae 
clamor explodat, etiam cum laceratione animarum plerumque dissimulata, 
interdum et aperta, pacatissime, ut opinor, et comodissime placuit a meipso 
interrogatum mihique respondentem deo adiuvante verum quaerere’ (Soliloquiorum 
libri duo, 2. 7. 14) 
 
[There is no better way of seeking the truth than the question and answer 
method. It is, however, hard to find anyone who would not be ashamed to be 
beaten in an argument. The almost inevitable result is that a babble of dissent 
caused by wilful obstinacy will destroy a topic which up to this has been carefully 
canvassed in the discussion. People are cut to the quick, and even if they 
generally conceal their feelings, on occasion, too, they show them openly] 45 
 
Augustine’s observations are telling, since they point to an alternative definition 
of dialectic: interior, silent, contemplative, and especially solitary—this is after all a 
soliloquy. Echoes of such ideas can be heard elsewhere in Augustine’s works, even in the 
De Doctrina, with its warning about the unspeakability of the divine realities, and the 
associated devaluation of the arts of debate: ‘Quae pugna uerborum silentio cauenda 
potius quam uoce pacanda est’ (De Doctrina 1. 6. 6) [‘It is better to evade this verbal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Soliloquiorum libri duo ; De inmortalitate animae ; De quantitate animae ed. by Wolfgang Hörmann, Sancti 
Aureli Augustini opera 14 (Vienna, 1986); English translation in Saint Augustine, Soliloquies and Immortality of 
the soul, ed. with an introduction, translation and commentary by Gerard Watson (Warminster, 1990). 
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conflict silently than to quell it disputatiously’].46 This hesitancy to debate spiritual 
realities by means of ordinary language is endemic in Augustine’s writings on language 
and semiotics, characterised by the fundamental split in between linguistic signa and 
supra-linguistic, spiritual res.47 The De Magistro in particular stresses how inner truths 
ultimately elude the grasp of language altogether, and how language can at best point to 
knowledge already gained elsewhere and otherwise:  
 
cum verba proferuntur, aut scire nos quid significent, aut nescire: si scimus, 
commemorari potius quam discere; si autem nescimus, ne commemorari quidem, 
sed fortasse ad quaerendum admoneri (De Magistro 11.36). 
 
[‘when words are spoken we either know what they signify, or we don’t: if we 
know, it’s reminding rather than learning; if we don’t know, it isn’t even 
reminding, though perhaps we recollect that we should enquire’].48  
 
Knowledge itself is thus not produced by outwardly spoken words, but either by 
experience in the case of ordinary realities, or inner revelation in case of higher truths. 
The latter, crucially, are communicated by a different form of language altogether, the 
living logos of Christ dwelling in the inner man:  
 
De universis autem quae intellegimus non loquentem qui personat foris, sed intus 
ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut consulamus 
admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Sancti Aurelii Augustini, De doctrina christiana, ed. Joseph Martin, CCSL 32 (Turnhout, 1962); English 
translation from Saint Augustine, On Christian Teaching, ed. R.P.H. Green (Oxford, 1997). 
47 See especially B. Darrell Jackson, ‘The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine's De doctrina christiana’, Revue des 
Études Augustiniennes 15 (1969), 9–49; Roland J. Teske ‘Criteria for Figurative Interpretation in St. 
Augustine’, and David Dawson, ‘Sign Theory, Allegorical Reading, and the Motions of the Soul in De 
doctrina christiana’, both in ‘De Doctrina Christiana’: A Classic of Western Culture, ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and 
Pamela Bright (Notre Dame and London, 1995), respectively 109–22 and 123–41. On the role of silence 
within such a semiotics, see Stock, Augustine the Reader, 7–9. 
48 See Augustinus, Contra academicos; De beata vita; De ordine; De magistro; De libero arbitrio, ed. W.M. Green and 
K.D. Daur, CCSL 29 (Turnhout, 1970). Translation from Augustine, Against Academicians; The Teacher, ed. 
and trans. Peter King (Indianapolis, 1995). 
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est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia (De Magistro 
11.38). 
 
[Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don’t consult a 
speaker who makes sounds outside us, but the truth that presides within over the 
mind itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him. What is more, He 
who is consulted, He who is said to dwell in the inner man, does teach: Christ—
that is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God.] 
 
Later authors with a contemplative bias often built on Augustine’s semiotics and the 
associated epistemology to articulate their own reservations about loquacious 
dialecticians. This included ferocious opponents like Peter Damian49 and Walter of St 
Victor,50 but also more moderate figures such as John of Salisbury, who in his influential 
Metalogicon argues for a cautious use of dialectic that betrays his own ambivalence.51  
Deguileville would doubtless have been familiar with such reservations about the 
role of dialectic by contemplative and monastic authors. Yet since his poem is an account 
of a dynamic, experiential learning process in the world, written for a lay audience, the 
bulk of his efforts is dedicated to explaining far more ordinary forms of knowledge 
acquired through reasoning, debate and empirical observation. With the appearance of 
the figure of Aristotle in the poem, Deguileville’s anxiety about the arts of debate 
becomes more focused. He now seeks to differentiate the excessive argumentative 
probing of strictly Aristotelian logic from a rather different form of dialectic, more 
compatible with the poem’s Augustinian, sapiential aims. Initially Aristotle is introduced 
as a representative of natural science, Nature’s own clerk (PVH1 2918), and is like 
Nature unable to explain the miracle of the transubstantiation.52 Aristotle here is not so 
much dismissed as literally put in his place, like Nature before him. Yet the actual terms 
of the debate are particularly revealing, since they immediately evoke the practice of 
scholastic disputatio. Initially it is Aristotle himself who begins by accusing Sapience of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 André Cantin, Les sciences séculières et la foi: Les deux voies de la science au jugement de Saint Pierre Damien, 1007–
1072 (Spoleto, 1972). 
50 Pierre Glorieux, ‘Le Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae de Gauthier de Saint-Victor’, Archives d’histoire 
doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 27 (1952), 187–335. 
51 Brown, Contrary Things, 36–52. 
52 On Aristotle in PVH see especially Kamath, ‘Rewriting Ancient Auctores’, whose observations I develop 
here. 
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fallacious reasoning, and points out that he, unlike Sapience, does not use ‘argumens’ 
(PVH1 2936) like a ‘sophiste’ (PVH1 2942). Sapience first pointedly rejects all 
accusations of ‘sophisterie, / De fraude et de deception / Par faute de discretion’ (PVH1 
3076–8) [‘Sophistical reasoning, fraud and deception for lack of discretion/discernment’], 
and then turns the argument around by claiming ownership of the art of dialectic.  
Indeed dialectic is not so much dismissed as redefined, transformed to serve the 
higher aims of theology. Sapience claims the school of dialectic as her school, where she 
teaches  
 
A arguer et desputer  
Et a jugier et discerner 
Entre le bon et le mauves (PVH1 3013–15) 
 
[to argue and dispute, to judge and discern between the good and the bad.] 
 
It is in this second school that Sapience’s daughter ‘Science’ was trained and offered in 
marriage to Aristotle, yet Sapience also stresses that she withheld some of her secrets 
from Aristotle (PVH1 3067–71). This is a cheap but effective trick, since it manipulates 
the situation to make Aristotle himself appear as a flawed practitioner of the 
‘Aristotelian’ dialectic method. Aristotelian dialectic itself is no longer under the aegis of 
Aristotle, but under the rule of Sapience, which makes the art of dialectic literally 
‘sapiential’.  
While Deguileville initially exposes the inability of Aristotelian dialectic to 
illuminate weighty theological matters, then, his principal figures of authority finally 
appropriate the terms and techniques of dialectic argumentation to lend credibility to 
their own authority and to further their sapiential agenda. Such a strategy leaves us with a 
rather peculiar brand of dialectic, which authorises Sapience to state that the real 
presence in the Eucharist must be ‘crëu fermement / Sans faire en adevinement (PVH1 
3117–8) [‘firmly believed, rather than speculated about’]. Grace Dieu’s invocation of 
Aristotle as an authority to support her own claims of precedence against Nature during 
the earlier debate is similarly dubious and rhetorically manipulative given these later 
developments:  
 
Aristote qui fu paiens, 
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Qui verite par argumens 
Bien connut, fas mon advocat 
Encontre vous dans ce debat.  
Il dit et preuve par raison  
Que faite est generation 
Par mon soleil dont j’ai parle (PVH1 1757–63) 
 
[Aristotle who was a pagan, who knew the truth through argument, is my 
advocate against you in this debate. He says and proves through reason that 
generation is achieved through my sun of which I have spoken] 
 
Grace here seeks to counter the threat that Arisototelian dialectic might pose to 
sapiential theology by co-opting it for her own ends⎯but we are never told by what 
‘argumens’ Aristotle supposedly demonstrated the authority of Grace’s position on the 
matter. Grace merely evokes the familiar Aristotelian idea of generation through the sun 
(cf. e.g. Aristotle, Physics 2. 2, 194b13), an image that is immediately twisted, however, to 
serve as a further element in Grace’s distinctly symbolic evocation of cosmic hierarchies. 
Grace’s ‘conclusion’ derived from Aristotle’s ‘argumens’, is highly dubious by the 
standards of dialecetic, however defined, and smacks of playground tactics rather than 
the schoolroom: 
 
 Et pour ce, se l’avoie oste, 
 Vostre pouoir vous perdrïez 
Et rien faire ne pourrïes (PVH1 1764–6) 
 
[And therefore, if I removed it (i.e. the sun), you would loose your power and  
could do nothing about it.] 
 
Grace’s appropriation of Aristotle’s authority is almost exclusively rhetorical, and 
employed to buttress a claims for precedence that in reality rest on authority rather than 
argumentation. 
Aristotle’s request for clarifications concerning the real presence in the poem 
leads to similar rhetorical manipulations. Aristotle is initially perplexed by the affirmation 
of the real presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament: 
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Entendez vous que locaument  
vertuaument ou autrement  
Soient mises celles choses 
Es lieus qu’avez dit et encloses [?] (PVH1 3221–4) 
 
[How exactly are these things enclosed in the place you have named? Do you  
mean this localiter, virtualiter or otherwise?]53 
 
But Sapience’s decision to respond to Aristotle by using these same terms, with their 
ostensibly scholastic and technical overtones, is essentially designed to convey the 
impression that she is truly engaging Aristotle on what are, supposedly, his own terms. In 
reality they conceal what is ultimately an evasive reply, losing itself in inconclusive 
digressions. Finally Sapience can do little more than restate a theological truth that 
cannot but appear dogmatic: 
 
... dedens ce pain 
Est vraiement mis le bien souvrain, 
Non pas voir imaginaument, 
Non representativement, 
Non vertuablement sans plus, 
Ainsi i est mis et contenus 
Corporelment et reaument, 
Presentement et vraiement, (PVH1 3243–50) 
 
[In this bread is truly placed the sovereign good, neither ymaginativae, nor 
representativae, nor virtualiter, but corporaliter and realiter, presencialiter and also veraciter]. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Here and in the quotation that follows my use of Latin terms to translate the French follows Lydgate, in 
order to stress the learned, academic resonance of such terms. As Kamath observes, Lydgate’s translation 
‘increases the resemblance of the debate to medieval scholastic exchanges’; see Kamath, ‘Rewriting Ancient 
Auctores’. Lydgate translates PVH2, but the passage is largely identical in PVH1. For the corresponding 
lines see PVH2 3377–408, and The Pilgrimage of the Life of Man 6013–60. 
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This, while it is presented as an answer formulated in technical terms, is actually 
pseudo-scholastic babble, and amounts to evading the issue altogether. Aristotle 
accordingly leaves the scene—and exits the poem—more exasperated than persuaded, 
observing that debate under such terms is impossible:  
 
 j’apercoif bien 
qu’a vous je ne gaignerai rien. 
Miex vaut assez moi en aler  
Que contre vous plus arguer. (PVH1 3295–8). 
 
The episode is of course intended to present Sapience as a genuinely proficient 
practitioner and indeed founder of the art of dialectic—but for an attentive reader the 
effect is almost invariably the reverse. Paradoxically Sapience first dismisses the art of 
dialectic argumentation and debate—yet then cannot resist appropriating them to further 
her own claims based on faith and authority. If anything the scene exposes Sapience’s 
failure to engage Aristotle on his own terms, and her fraudulent attempt to dress up her 
doctrinaire arguments in the rhetorical garb of a dialectical argument and a scholastic 
disputatio. Rather than supporting or buttressing the poem’s certitudes by supporting it 
with a genuinely dialectical demonstration, Sapience’s sleight of hand ultimately feeds 
doubt and uncertainty. 
Despite the rather dubious nature of Sapience’s claims, it is worth insisting on 
Deguileville’s desire to reclaim Aristotelian dialectic: the quarrel here is not so much over 
Augustine vs. Aristotle—as the older, binary model of a conflict among ‘Aristotelians’ 
and ‘Augustinitns’ would have it54—but it is a quarrel over the ‘right use’ of Aristotle 
within an allegory whose fundamental epistemological assumptions are, a priori, deeply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Among the most influential formulations, see Martin Grabmann, Der göttliche Grund menschlicher 
Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin (Münster, 1924); and Etienne Gilson, ‘Pourquoi 
Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin’, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen Âge 1 (1926–27), 5–
127; and ibid., ‘Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant’, in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du moyen Âge 4 (1929–1930), 5–149. For a recent constructive critique of the simplistic binary model 
that opposed ‘Augustinians’ to ‘Aristotelians’ see especially Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, 1:1–25. 
This questions also touches on the still larger problem of the clashes and overlaps between the disciplines 
of philosophy and theology, and their actual existence as separate disciplines or domains of intellectual 
inquiry, for which see M. W. F. Stone and Robert Wisnovsky, ‘Philosophy and Theology’, in Cambridge 
History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Pasnau and van Dyke, 2:689–706. 
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Platonist and Augustinian. PVH’s appropriation of Aristotle and Aristotelianism is all the 
more arresting for being essentially rhetorical, defensive and rather superficial. Debates 
between personifications are essentially designed to validate positions of authority 
already entrenched, and not to conduct a genuinely dialectic and heuristic inquiry into the 
issues raised: the objections of Nature, Raison and Aristotle are not so much resolved or 
effectively countered, but eventually brushed aside by the forceful interventions of Grace 
Dieu and Sapience.55 Aristotle leaves the scene exasperated rather than enlightened by 
Sapience’s arguments (PVH1 3293–306), just like Rude Entendement—personification 
of stubborn literalism—is not persuaded or converted through argument, but curtly and 
awkwardly dismissed (PVH1 5621–32).56 
While this may have been enough for many readers—bowing to the authority of 
Grace Dieu, Sapience and the monk from Chaalis himself—it appears not to have been 
quite enough for the author himself. Despite the rather self-confident and dismissive 
attitude of Sapience and Grace Dieu in the poem, Deguileville remains finally 
unconvinced by his own attempt to appropriate dialectic for sapiential ends. Part of the 
problem may lie in the inherently doctrinaire, often unsophisticated, evasive or vague 
nature of many arguments mustered by Grace Dieu and Sapience, dressed up in a thin 
garb of scholastic terminology. Deguileville is caught in a paradox, simultaneously 
rejecting the possibility of proving theological truths by argument, yet trying to 
appropriate dialectic methods to do exactly that, and thus buttress the supremacy of his 
authority figures. Yet such inconclusive, finally abortive debates have the undesirable 
side-effect of making a number of the poem’s certitudes appear ‘debatable’⎯subjecting 
them to demonstrations, objections and counterarguments, increasingly sprawling and 
defensive as the poem advances. Deguileville thus finds himself forced to resolve, or 
rather escape and short-circuit a number of problematic, insoluble questions he has 
opened up for himself within his own poem. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Parts of my argument have been inspired by Nicolette Zeeman’s considerations on Deguileville in a 
paper on ‘Debate and its Contradictions’, given at the Medieval English Seminar in Oxford on 22 May 
2013. I would like to thank Dr. Zeeman warmly for generously sharing her typescript and for stimulating 
subsequent conversation. 
56 See Fabienne Pomel, ‘L’épisode de Rude Entendement: Mots et choses, bons et mauvais lecteurs, du 
Roman de la Rose au Pèlerinage de Vie Humaine et d’une version à l’autre’, in Mittelalterliche Literatur als 
Retextualisierung, ed. Kablitz and Peters, 265–86. I would like to thank the author and the editors for kindly 
sharing this essay ahead of publication. 
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Debating with the Rose 
 
Deguileville remains deeply uncomfortable with the questions and possibilities opened 
up by his engagement with dialectic reasoning and argumentation. His fears about the 
intractable nature of dialectic are exacerbated by his sustained, deep interest in the ‘biau 
roumans de la Rose’ (PVH1 11)—a poem that already takes the heuristic principles of 
dialectic to their extreme consequences and conclusions.  
This connection appears most clearly during a later episode in the pilgrim’s quest. 
Once the pilgrim finally sets out on his journey, he arrives at a parting of the ways 
(PVH1 6503–20 ff.): on the one side Labour, and on the other side Huiseuse, a figure 
already familiar from the Rose, where she had invited the lover into the garden of ‘deduit’, 
or delight. Yet Deguileville’s Huiseuse has added to her many other fruitless pursuits also 
an interest in logic⎯on Sundays and Church holidays only: 
 
Festes songë et dimenches 
Pour lire unes foiz elenches, 
Pour menconges enmanteler 
Et faire les voir ressembler, 
Pour raconter trufes et fables, 
Roumans et choses mencongables. (PVH1 6851–6) 
 
[I dream up (or ‘long for’) feast days and Sundays, to read elenchus, so as to wrap 
up lies and make them look like the truth, to tell trifles and fables, romances and 
mendacious things]57 
 
This striking passage combines reference to ‘fables, trufes et romans’ and to the 
‘elenches’⎯Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi, and by extension to the logica nova. Given the 
context and the identity of Huiseuse as a character from the Rose, the evocation of 
‘romauns’ can be taken to allude specifically to the Roman de la Rose itself as well as 
courtly romances more broadly.58 Indeed the Roman de la Rose is literally Huiseuse’s book, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The passage is syntactically unclear and difficult to translate and interpret; I would like to thank Graham 
Robert Edwards for clarifying its meaning in discussions.  
58 Maupeu and Edwards similarly read the passage as a direct allusion to the Rose, see the forthcoming 
edition of PVH2, note to l. 7898. 
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a book of fruitless, aristocratic leisure, and this dismissive remark on Deguileville’s part 
points forward to his much more hostile attitude towards the Rose in PVH2, where the 
wholly unsavoury Lady Venus claims ownership of the poem.59 
But what is Huiseuse doing with Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi? Like Nature she 
clearly enjoys sterile argumentative quibbling instead of the predicatio she should be 
listening to in church, but that is not all. Deguileville here provides a pointedly negative 
characterisation of the ‘elenches’ as a text that enables Huiseuse to ‘menconges 
enmanteler’, to pack up lies under the veil of truth. Such accusations are remarkably 
similar to those voiced by Deschamps in his translation of Vitalis of Blois’ Geta, which 
points to the wider currency of this idea:  
 
Car logique sert de cette oeuvre 
et fait par argumens sembler 
ce qui n’est pas et ressembler 
une chose a l’autre opposite 
 
[For logic performs this work, and by its arguments makes the inexistent appear,  
and makes one thing seem like its opposite]60  
 
Deguileville’s similar point here may have less to do with the actual nature of the 
Sophistici elenchi than with their use: the elenchi were in theory designed to enable the 
recognition of fallacious reasoning in a dialectical argumentation, and were thus in 
principle conducive to greater ‘discernement’—yet clearly such a skill could also be 
employed for the obverse purpose of dissimulating the truth, in the manner of Faus 
Semblant in the Rose.61 Again, dialectic was felt to be a two-edged sword. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See especially Huot, Readers, 225–30, and references given in my concluding observations below. 
60 Eustache Deschamps, Un Traictié de Geta et d’Amphitrion, lines 338–41, in Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Gaston 
Raynaud, 9 vols (Paris: Champion, 1893), 8:222. Discussed also in Brown, Contrary Things, 61–2. 
61 Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations (New 
York, 2003), 1–7. This appears to be also Jean de Meun’s point in a complex and frequently misunderstood 
passage spoken by Faus Semblant (RR 11026–34): he asserts that not even someone armed with the sharp 
razor of ‘elanches’ may see through his acts of dissimulation. The passage may have provided the 
immediate inspiration for Deguileville in this passage and for PVH1 679–81, discussed below, but contrary 
to what is sometimes claimed, the passage in the Rose does not offer a negative characterisation of the 
elenchi as such, although the work is invoked by the sinister character of Faus Semblant. 
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Deguileville may well have been aware of the contested, problematic status of the 
elenchi in the Aristotelian corpus,62 but he may also be subsuming the elenchi within a 
wider, mostly unrelated category of medieval sophismata literature produced within Arts 
Faculties.63 These consisted of logical puzzles, often insoluble, employed as exercises in 
disputatio, a pursuit that to colleagues from the Theology Faculty appeared as largely 
fruitless and futile.64 But also Deguileville’s implicit association of the term ‘sophistical’ 
with purely rhetorical, ornamental verbal performance of ‘fables’ and ‘romans’ was not 
new, and is already found in Augustine’s De doctrina, certainly an important touchstone 
text for the PVH as a whole: ‘Quamquam etiam sermo non captiosus, sed tamen 
abundantius quam grauitatem decet, uerborum ornamenta consectans, sophisticus 
dicitur’ (DDC 2.31.48) [‘But the word “sophistical” is also applied to a style which is not 
captious, but goes in for verbal ornament on a scale that does not suit a serious writer’].65 
Other pejorative connotations of the terms ‘sophisma’ or ‘sophisticus’ are not foreign to 
the Rose,66 and may simply have rubbed off on Deguileville’s perception of what the 
sophistici elenchi actually were and the purpose they could be made to serve. This appears 
to have exacerbated an already ambivalent attitude towards the elenchi in late-medieval 
discussions of the virtues and dangers of dialectic. 
What really matters for my present argument is that the Rose and the elenchi are 
characterised in analogous fashion as providing perverted integumenta, used not for 
veiling/revealing higher realities as in twelfth-century Neoplatonic allegory, but as empty 
shells, unsubstantial involucra used for dissimulating falsehood under the semblance of 
truth. This idea of the elenchi as a means of dissimulation occurs elsewhere in PVH, in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See particularly Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, 3 vols (Leiden, 
1981), who comments on the persistently ambivalent attitude towards the elenchi throughout its reception 
history, since it did often ‘appear morally suspect to study the art of deception’, 1:88, and passim. See also 
Brown, Contrary Things, 46, who comments on John of Salisbury’s condemnation of Alberic of Rheims in 
the Metalogicon (2.10) for his excessively radical and potentially agnostic dialecticism, determined precisely 
by the latter’s immersion in the elenchi. 
63 A similar suggestion is also made by Maupeu and Edwards in their forthcoming edition of PVH2, see 
notes to line 7694. 
64 Paul Vincent Spade, ‘Sophismata’, in Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Pasnau and van Dyke, 
1:185–95, who notes the disapproval of theologians, and their invariably pejorative use of the term 
‘sophisma’, 189–90. 
65 Ed. Martin; English translation by Green, On Christian Teaching. 
66 Susanne Stekel, False Roses: Structures of Duality and Deceit in Jean de Meun’s ‘Roman de la rose’ (Saratoga, CA, 
1991), 86–7; Hilder, Der Scholastische Wortschatz, 148–55. 
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complex passage where Raison lectures Moses, a bishop figure, exhorting him to be 
merciful despite his appearance of severity: 
 
Dedens soies misericors, 
Quel que tu soies par dehors! 
Fallace d’elenche puez faire  
cy endroit sans toy meffaire (PVH1 679–82) 
 
[Be merciful on the inside, whatever your outward appearance! In this case you 
may practice the fallacy of elenchus without doing amiss.] 
 
The passage thus exhorts a balancing act between Old Testament Justice and New 
Testament Mercy in terms of a coincidentia oppositorum of outward appearance, or the 
‘letter’, and inner substance, or the ‘spirit’. While in this specific case the ‘fallace 
d’elenche’ is tolerated and even encouraged, it is clearly presented as an act of 
dissimulation where outward appearance is antithetical to the inner substance,67 and 
points forward to Huiseuse’s use of ‘elenches’ to wrap up mendacious fictions in 
analogous ways to the Rose.  
Deguileville’s notion of the Rose as a deceptive integumentum is certainly a 
defensible characterisation of the poem, with its repeatedly frustrated promises to unveil 
a ‘diffinitive sentance’ (RR 19474), an ultimate truth that is endlessly deferred and 
concealed under the Rose’s luxuriant foliage68⎯even if Deguileville’s understanding of the 
Rose in such purely duplicitous terms is, like any reading of the elusive Rose, necessarily 
subjective, partial and reductive. For Deguileville the problem with both the Rose and 
Aristotelian dialectic is their slipperiness, their avoidance of closure and their status as 
heuristic instruments of exploration that do not affirm or even imply any clearly 
identifiable epistemology.69 They are not closed discourses but open methods, tools that 
may be employed for genuinely exploratory purposes⎯and this makes them extremely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The passage may indeed rely on a misreading of RR 11026–34⎯see n.61 above. It is discussed in some 
detail, together with its interesting expansions in Lydgate’s fifteenth-century English verse translation, by 
Kamath, ‘Rewriting Ancient Auctores’.  
68 See for instance Stekel, False Roses; and Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, ‘Overt and Covert: Amorous and 
Interpretive Strategies in the Roman de la Rose’, Romania 111 (1990), 432–53. 
69 On the perceived risks and dangers of dialectic in this sense see Brown, Contrary Things, 36–62. On the 
Rose’s ‘scepticism’, in its technical sense, see Zeeman, ‘Philosophy in Parts’. 
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difficult to regulate in an allegorical narrative that pursues specifically sapiential 
objectives and is committed to an Augustinian ideal of knowledge through divine 
illumination. Finally it is not so much the Rose’s erotic theme as its uncompromisingly 
dialectical method that is intractable for Deguileville, since it leads to a sceptical deferral 
of epistemological certitudes and deflates the possibility of establishing a firm 
authoritative discourse within the narrative. 
But in trying to hold the Rose at arm’s length, Deguileville paradoxically also flags 
up the inextricable implication of his own poetics with those of Jean de Meun. I 
observed that he characterises Huiseuse’s reading practices⎯and implicitly the Rose 
itself⎯as being made up of ‘fables, trufes’ and ‘choses mencongables’. Yet in 
characterising the Rose in such terms, Deguileville reveals that he has already interiorised 
the Rose’s own warnings about the dangers of mendacious fiction. The terms are 
recurrent throughout the Rose, and the cluster employed here by Deguileville appears to 
be lifted en bloc from a passage where Nature condemns the self-deluding operation of 
dream visions and allegorical fictions: 
 
et ce n’est for trufle et mançonge, 
ainsinc con de l’ome qui songe, 
qui voit, ce cuide, en leur presances 
les esperituex sustances, 
si con fist Scipion jadis; (RR 18333–7; my emphases) 
 
[and this is nothing but lies and deceptions, just like those of the man who 
dreams and sees⎯or so he thinks⎯spiritual substances in actual presence, like 
Scipio did in his day] 
 
In Jean’s poem of course the passage is intended to trigger the reader’s scepticism 
towards the truth-content of the Rose itself, specifically Guillaume de Lorris’s earlier 
‘authorising’ invocation of Macrobius (RR 7)⎯itself possibly ironic.70 It is precisely in 
such passages that the Rose takes dialecticism to extremes, interrogating its own 
epistemological status as an allegorical dream-narrative in the midst of a discussion of the 
distorting and deforming properties of mirrors. But the passage also has the effect of 
undermining the truth-claims of all, earlier and subsequent allegorical dream 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See also Huot, Dreams of Lovers, 20. 
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narratives71⎯including of course PVH. Indeed within the same section of Nature’s 
speech, Jean de Meun already dismantles, proleptically and uncannily, exactly the kind of 
narrative we find in PVH: 
 
 maint an sunt si deceü 
que de leur liz s’en sunt meü, 
et se chaucent neïs et vestent 
et de tout leur hernois s’aprestent 
[...] 
prannent bourdons, prannent escharpes, 
[...] 
et vont cheminant longues voies, 
et ne sevent ou toutevoies (RR 18275–84) 
 
[many are so deceived by this (i.e. visions), that they have risen from their beds, 
put their shoes on, get dressed, and put on their whole armour; they pick up their 
scrip and staff and wander far and wide, without however knowing where they 
are going’]   
 
Nature, furthermore, specifically identifies contemplative excess as one of the reasons 
behind such self-deluding visions: 
 
 Ou qui, par grant devocion, 
 en trop grant contemplacion, 
 font apparair en leur pansees 
 les choses qu’il ont porpansees, 
et les cuident tout proprement 
voair defors apertement (RR 18327–32) 
 
[Or those who, through great devotion and excessive contemplation, generate in 
their thoughts the things they have pondered upon, and think that they can 
properly, openly see them on the outside] 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Kay, ‘Women’s Body of Knowledge’, 231. 
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Deguileville⎯who presents his dream of a pilgrimage as a distinctively contemplative 
vision experienced within a monastic setting (PVH1 31–44)⎯could hardly avoid 
recognising his own pilgrim-dreamer persona in such a portrait upon rereading the Rose.72 
He appears to have internalised such reflections on the epistemologically dubious value 
of visions and allegorical fictions only too well, finding himself forced to question the 
self-authorising strategy of his own vernacular allegorical poetics at the same time as he 
tries to cut himself off from the Rose.  
 
 Debate without end 
 
Deguileville’s reservations about the authority and truth-value of his own vision, much 
exacerbated in PVH2, already emerge in the defensive remarks at the end of the original 
version: 
 
 Se ce songe n’ai bien songie, 
 Je pri qu’a droit soit corrigie 
 De ceuz qui songier miex saront 
 Ou qui miex faire le pourront. 
 Tant di aussi que, se menconge 
 I a aucune, que a songe 
 Soit repute, quar par songier 
 Ne se fait pas tout voir noncier. 
 Nulle erreur je ne vourroie 
 Maintenir par nulle voie, (PVH1 13517–26) 
 
[If I have not dreamt this dream well, I pray that it may be amended and 
corrected by those who will be able to dream more successfully, or those who 
can improve upon it. I equally say: if there were to be any lies, let the blame be 
placed upon the dream, since dreaming can never declare (or ‘announce’) the 
whole truth. I would never wish to assert any error, in no manner whatsoever.] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This raises the (insoluble) question of Deguileville’s degree and depth of knowledge of the Rose at 
different moments of his writing career. Sylvia Huot has suggested that initially he may have known the 
Rose only in an ‘expurgated’ and abridged B-manuscript, encountering a complete, uncensored version only 
after completing PVH1, see Readers, 211, 228 and passim.  
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Despite Deguileville’s desire to resolve dialogism into monologism, then, his confidence 
in the authority of Grace Dieu’s master-discourse finally appears to be fragile, always 
potentially eroded by the internalised, barely suppressed objections of Jean de Meun’s 
Nature. Her sceptical remarks pre-empt the possibility of writing an internally self-
validating spiritual dream-vision, facing Deguileville with the impossibility of ever 
concluding his sustained intertextual disputatio with the Rose with any authoritative 
refutation or demonstration. Even if he rejects the poetics of Huiseuse, exposes the 
limitations of Nature and ridicules the clumsiness of Aristotle, he seems finally unable to 
defuse the Rose’s formidable, all-pervasive ability to interrogate itself and all the 
discourses it comes into contact with⎯including that of Grace Dieu. Deguileville seems 
to have internalised the Rose’s dialecticism rather too deeply to be able to manipulate it 
effectively and keep it at bay. 
This internalised dialecticism finally contaminates Deguileville’s own poetic 
method, pushing him to simultaneously embrace and suppress a sceptical stance towards 
the workings of his own allegory. PVH is forced to adopt a defensive, reactive posture in 
relation to the Rose, and Deguileville unpacks argumentatively the Augustinian principles 
of PVH’s sapiential allegorical poetics⎯even if such principles are by definition logically 
indemonstrable, being postulated on an illuminationist epistemology rather than a 
structured use of dialectical reasoning. This defensive urge to demonstrate the 
indemonstrable takes the form of the clumsy, finally doctrinaire responses to the 
insistent, nagging objections of the many hostile personifications that inhibit the 
pilgrim’s progress with their demands for explanation in PVH: Rude Entendement, 
Nature, the Pilgrim’s own body. These are of course ventriloquised ‘Others’, represented 
in the poem only in order to be proven wrong, overcome, or dismissed⎯and yet their 
often powerful arguments finally originate within the poet’s own imagination, fill the 
pages of PVH, make up the bulk of the poem itself, and finally reveal an internal fracture 
that can never be definitively healed or exorcised.73 The poem’s univocal master-
discourse of predicatio is thus constantly threatened by an internal, fractious disputatio, 
embroiling Deguileville in insoluble counterarguments with himself, and forcing him to 
assert indemonstrable propositions dressed up as the pseudo-scholastic argumentations 
of Grace Dieu and Sapience. Trying to counter the threat of dialectic with its own tools, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See also Kay, The Place of Thought, 92–3. 
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Deguileville becomes a mouthpiece for his own self-doubt, and eventually writes himself 
into an argumentative deadlock.  
Such tendencies are exacerbated in his later, revised and longer version of the 
poem, PVH2 (1355–6). Deguileville here is increasingly doubtful of the ability of his own 
allegory to transmit any form of stable truth under the veil of fables and fictions.74 This 
leads to a more hostile attitude towards the slipperiness of the Rose and a still more 
problematic denial of PVH1’s ‘romanesque’ affinities and digressive tendencies.75 Here 
Deguileville labours desperately hard to guide and control the interpretation of his 
allegory more firmly, in the hope of restoring the possibility of an authoritative, univocal 
hermeneutics. Throughout PVH2 he systematically seeks to suppress ambiguity, 
mobilising a host of internal glosses and intradiegetic documents, often in Latin, in order 
to lend greater learning and authority to his vision, suppress potential misinterpretation, 
and anticipate hypothetical counterarguments.76 Yet such reiterated self-authorising 
efforts are counterproductive, and lend the allegory a more apologetic, defensive, and 
often verbose quality that threatens to spin out of control⎯and indeed Deguileville 
supplements PVH2 with two further pilgrimage allegories, the Pèlerinage de l’Âme and the 
Pèlerinage Jhesucrist, and a cycle of Latin poems under the heading of the Eveil du Pèlerin 
(‘The Awakening of the Pilgrim’).77 As Fabienne Pomel has shown, the desire for 
totalising closure and resolution that animates this renewed allegorising has become 
anxious and obsessive, and self-justification and auto-exegesis threaten to degenerate into 
‘narrative cancer’.78  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See especially Philippe Maupeu, ‘statut de l’image rhétorique et de l’image peinte dans le Pèlerinage de Vie 
Humaine de Guillaume de Deguileville’, Le Moyen Âge 114 (2008), 509–30. 
75 Fabienne Pomel, ‘L'allégorie: une voie de déni du romanesque ? Le cas de quelques réécritures du Roman 
de la Rose’, in Le Romanesque aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Daniel Bohler, Eidôlon 83 (2009), 41–54; and Pomel, 
‘L’épisode de Rude Entendement’. 
76 On Deguileville’s use of Latin and Macaronic intradiegetic documents as a self-authorising strategy, see 
especially Fabienne Pomel, ‘Les écrits pérégrins ou les voies de l’autorité chez Guillaume de Deguileville: 
Le modèle épistolaire et juridique’, in The Pèlerinage Allegories, ed. Kamath and Nievergelt, 91–111.  
77 On the Eveil du Pèlerin, and on Deguileville’s Latin poetry more broadly, see especially Graham Robert 
Edwards, ‘Making Sense of Deguileville’s Autobiographical Project: The Evidence of Paris, BnF MS Latin 
14845’, in The Pèlerinage Allegories, ed. Kamath and Nievergelt, 129–50; on the role of Latin see also Frédéric 
Duval, ‘Deux prières latines de Guillaume de Digulleville: Prière à Saint Michel et prière à l’ange gardien’, 
in Pèlerinages Allégoriques, ed. by Duval and Pomel, 185–211. 
78 See Fabienne Pomel, Les Voies de l’au-delà et l’essor de l’allégorie au Moyen age (Paris, 2001), 513–36. 
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Such efforts are finally self-defeating, exacerbating the digressive and 
argumentative qualities that Deguileville seeks to control. Aware of this dilemma, in the 
closing section of his revised poem he can do no more than relinquish his allegory’s self-
authorising and auto-exegetical claims, placing the burden of the quest for truth squarely 
on his readers, inviting them to sift the wheat from the chaff:  
 
[...] mon aventureux songe,  
Ouquel s’aucune mençonge  
Est meslee ou contenue  
Ou qui ait pou de value,  
Nul merveillier ne [s’en] devroit,  
Car onques forment on ne voit  
Croistre qui entour paille n’ait  
Jusqu’a tant que hors on l’en trait.  
Si que s’en mon songë a grain  
Et avec a paille et estrain,  
Ce qui est bon soit reserve 
Et qui bon n’est soit hors venne. (PVH2 17732–43) 
 
[... my adventurous dream, if it were to contain or be mixed with lies, or anything 
of little worth, let nobody be surprised; no wheat can grow without there being 
hay around it, until the wheat is taken out. So if there is any grain in my dream, 
together with hay and straw, let the good be kept and that which is no good 
winnowed out.] 
 
The image is of course conventional, but in the aftermath of the Rose⎯with its endlessly 
playful and subversive deconstruction of hermeneutic binaries that make up the 
‘integumanz aus poetes’ (RR 7138)⎯this invitation to unpack the allegory’s ‘grain’ 
sounds like a last resort bred by hermeneutic despair. Ultimately it reveals the failure of 
the narrator-preacher figure to convey a univocal lesson, and the failure of the allegory to 
resolve itself into monologic discourse through self-exegesis. Symptomatically, 
Deguileville no longer introduces his narrative by claiming the authoritative role of the 
preacher, reading to a group of assembled laypeople: the confidence in his own ability to 
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contain the digressive energies of the poem within the framework of an internally unified 
predicatio has disappeared. 
PVH2, moreover, no longer claims to represent the impersonal, transcendental 
authority of Grace Dieu in unproblematic and direct fashion. In PVH1 the figure of 
Labour/Occcupant⎯the counterpart of Huiseuse and one of the principal avatars of 
Deguileville’s authorial persona79⎯was still presented as a divinely inspired mouthpiece 
for Grace Dieu’s teaching: 
 
‘Garce Dieu, dist il, non pas moy, 
Que pas ne vois, si parle a toy. 
Elle me met tout en l’oreille 
Quanque je dy et me conseille.’ (PVH1 6663–6) 
 
[It is not I but Grace Dieu, who you can’t see, who speaks to you thus. She 
whispers into my ear all that I tell and advise you to do’] 
 
Yet in PVH2 Labour relinquishes his didactic role as a reliable guide and figure of 
authority, and declares himself unable to advise the pilgrim effectively on the choice of 
the right path: 
 
‘Si ne t’en çay plus que dire, 
Lequel que veulx pues eslire.’ (PVH2 7535–6) 
 
[‘So I can’t tell you any more, chose whatever path you wish’] 
 
The central activity of Labour, as a net-maker, remains the same in both versions, as the 
pilgrim notes: ‘[je] voy que souvent tu deffaiz / Ce qu’as bien fait et le refaiz (PVH1 
6569–70; cf. PVH2 7537–8) [‘I see that you often unmake, what you have already well 
made and then remake it’]. Yet the task of constant weaving and unweaving, as a figure 
of textual labour, interpretation and commentary, has lost its meditative, monastic 
appeal, and increasingly appears as a futile, endlessly protracted, solipsistic activity—like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The arguments here closely follow the reading presented in Maupeu, ‘Bivium’. The movement away from 
the impersonal authority of PVH1 to the more contingent, ‘autobiographical’ status of PVH2 provides the 
main argument of Maupeu’s Pèlerins de Vie Humaine. 
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the rewriting of PVH2 itself. The revised poem finally foregrounds the limitations of a 
kind of dialectic allegory that is seen as the product of human, contingent, and potentially 
endless textual and hermeneutic labour, condemned to unmake and remake itself 
constantly in the attempt to achieve some sort of closure. 
Finally, then, if on the surface PVH2 clearly displays a more hostile attitude to 
the Rose, on another level it also reveals Deguileville’s ever deeper internalisation of Jean 
de Meun’s sceptical dialecticism. In the very act of seeking to dissociate himself from the 
sophistical ‘menconges’ and the perversely hollow integumenta of the Rose, Deguileville 
finally shows that he has also learnt the Rose’s lessons, and begins to view the self-
authorising claims of his own allegory through the lens of Jean de Meun’s poetics of 
suspicion and irresolution. Ultimately it is the Rose itself, with its relentless drive towards 
questioning ‘given truths’ that paradoxically pushes Deguileville to reject his own PVH1 
as an unfinished, rough draft (PVH2 19–94). It is again the ever elusive and stubbornly 
talkative Rose that forces him to reopen the debate, pushing him to write a second, 
‘improved’, more argumentatively convoluted, defensive, conflicted and self-divided 
version in the desperate hope of patching up a leaking vessel. But every layer of revision 
and rewriting provides still further arguments, clauses and qualification in an increasingly 
unwieldy, cancerous disputatio that now opposes Deguileville’s poem both to the Rose and 
to itself, exacerbating the internal divisions of a supposedly monologic pilgrimage 
allegory, and deferring closure still further. What may have begun as a didactic 
undertaking seems to have mutated over time into an ever more heuristic experiment. 
Deguileville’s allegory finally ends up interrogating the very epistemological assumptions 
it originally set out to affirm, and reveals him as a far more receptive reader of the Rose 
than he would have liked to be. 
  
